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Title 
Classification and Concept Consistency 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the extent to which undergraduates consistently use a 
single mechanism as a basis for classifying mathematical objects. We argue that the 
concept image/concept definition distinction focuses on whether students use an accepted 
definition, but does not necessarily capture the more basic notion that there should be a 
fixed basis for classification.  We examine students’ classification of real sequences 
before and after exposure to definitions of ‘increasing’ and ‘decreasing’; we develop an 
abductive ‘plausible explanations’ method to estimate the consistency within the 
participants’ responses and suggest that this provides evidence that many students may 
lack what we call ‘concept consistency’.  
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Introduction 
The idea of classifying mathematical objects into well-defined categories or sets 
is central to mathematics, and has been so at least since Cantor.  It is not always easy to 
implement: as mathematics develops, there are debates about which definitions should be 
adopted; what is, or is not, classified as a ‘function’, a ‘polyhedron’ or a ‘set’ changes as 
the definitions are refined by successive generations of mathematicians (Lakatos, 1976; 
Rüthing, 1984).  Indeed, set theory has encountered problems (such as the ‘set of all 
sets’) that have required ever more intricate foundational elaboration to address 
(Ferreirós, 2007).  However, the idea that there are agreed definitions against which 
membership is judged is not contentious to most practicing mathematicians, and pure 
mathematics as experienced by undergraduate students is usually founded on the so-
called ‘classical model’ in which that a category is specified by a fixed definition. That is, 
category membership is completely determined by a set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions.   
Categories are fundamental to everyday cognition too: the act of classifying 
objects into categories is a natural human process, forming a vital way in which we make 
sense of the world around us (Markman, 1989).  Categories simplify and accelerate 
cognition, allowing us to predict and control regularities in the world and to make 
inferences about properties that are not immediately apparent (Gelman & Coley, 1991; 
Kruschke, 2005).  However, in everyday contexts, the classical model is a poor 
approximation: categories are not usually well-defined.  
This means that habits of everyday cognition need to be modified in order to work 
effectively in mathematics at the undergraduate level.  This paper is about the extent to 
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which the use of the classical model, as described above, is evidenced in students’ 
thinking during the transition to advanced mathematics. 
 
Theoretical background 
The classical model, as well as having a foundational role in mathematics, was the 
commonly held view of general cognition (e.g. Boole, 1854/1951) until research began to 
uncover effects for which it could not account.  Natural thought seems to involve 
categories with radial structures and ill-defined boundaries: people behave as though 
categories can have ‘branches’ that do not share common properties, or as though some 
objects are more or less ‘central’ within a category.  For example, Smith, Shoben and 
Rips (1974) found that people were quicker to classify a robin as a bird than to classify a 
penguin as a bird.  To account for such effects, cognitive models for natural human 
category learning commonly build on prototype theory (Rosch, 1973), in which 
classification involves testing similarity against an abstracted summary of experience 
with category members, or on exemplar theory (Medin & Schaffer, 1978), in which 
classification involves testing against a number of specific stored exemplars.  More 
recent research suggests that natural categorisation may be better modelled with a 
combination of these mechanisms, incorporating selective attention so that some features 
of exemplars are weighted more highly for the purposes of classification in certain 
contexts (see Kruschke, 2005).  All such models, however, aim to account for human 
categorisation in everyday contexts, and not for learning involving categories based on 
the (naïve) formal mathematical idea that an element belongs to a set if and only if it 
satisfies some fixed properties.   
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Lakoff and Nuñez have argued that even the seemingly rigorous foundations of 
mathematics based on sets and formal logic (the ‘formal foundational principle’) are at 
odds with ‘mathematics…viewed as a human conceptual system’ (Lakoff & Nuñez, 
1998, p.93); so much so, they argue, that ‘sets and logic’ and ‘human mathematics’ are 
simply different forms of mathematics that ‘yield different results…each of which is 
perfectly valid in its own sphere’ (ibid, p.86).  This view is challenged by some 
professional mathematicians, who claim that it conflates ‘mathematical facts’ with 
‘human knowledge of mathematical facts’ (Gold, 2001).  Whatever the case, the 
mathematics as it is encountered traditionally in undergraduate courses is presented 
according to the classical model.  Thus we should expect conflict arising from the 
difference between natural forms of classification and those required for the formal 
mathematics encountered by undergraduates. 
In mathematics education, Tall and Vinner highlighted the cause of such conflict 
when they introduced the key notions of concept image and concept definition.  They 
argued that a student might sometimes reason using their concept image, where this term 
means ‘the total cognitive structure that is associated with the concept, which includes all 
the mental pictures and associated properties and processes’ (Tall & Vinner, 1981, 
p.152).  Concept images can be built over years of encounters with mathematical 
concepts in the form of examples, different representations, tasks etc.  Researchers have 
argued that reasoning with reference to concept images alone may be productive in many 
cases, but that a student may misclassify if their concept image is not fully developed or 
not coincident with the extension of the definition (Davis & Vinner, 1986).  Such 
misclassifications and related misinterpretations are prevalent in the cases involving 
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functions and graphs (Vinner, 1991), limits (Davis & Vinner, ibid.), derivatives (Zandieh, 
2000), tangents (Biza, Christou & Zachariades, 2008) etc.  One could argue that 
classifying according to a concept image amounts to using natural classification in a 
mathematical context; concept images might be similar in structure to natural categories 
while mathematical judgements need to be based on (or at least accord with) formal, 
agreed definitions. So judgements based on a concept image can sometimes leads to 
conclusions that conflict with the formal theory. 
In Tall and Vinner’s terms, then, students need to learn to work with concept 
definitions in formal mathematical contexts.  This is not easy.  Some difficulties arise 
from the specifics of definitions encountered: it can be challenging to work with 
statements involving highly compressed mathematical symbols and complex logical 
structures (Dubinsky, Elterman & Gong, 1988), especially if the evocative nature of the 
words they define (‘converges’, ‘tends to’ etc.) makes it easy to fall back on natural 
strategies (Tall & Vinner, 1981; Monaghan, 1991).   
Such difficulties may be exacerbated by messages implicit in textbooks.  Raman 
(2004), for instance, highlighted a range of relationships between the presentation and use 
of definitions in texts related to calculus.  She found that in a precalculus textbook, 
definitions of continuity were presented informally and classifications were based on 
graphical imagery; in a calculus text, formal definitions were given but tasks did not 
require their use, and in an analysis text, formal definitions were both given and regularly 
used.  The first two approaches may not lead naturally to the third, though such 
pedagogical sequences may be unavoidable if we wish to introduce a concept before the 
formal theory is accessible (Barbé et. al., 2005).  However, they may result in a lack of 
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clarity about the role of definitions, which may be further compounded by the 
introduction of different forms of the same definition: Bergé (2008) observed the 
definition of completeness transforming through three distinct (but equivalent) variants as 
students move through three successive courses.  Of course, there may be sound 
pedagogical reasons for using a particular variant of a definition at a certain stage, but it 
might not be clear to the students that such definitions are supposed to be logically 
equivalent and thus determine identical extensions.   
Students’ understanding and use of definitions has been the subject of a 
considerable research literature, including studies on the nature of definitions (e.g. Van 
Dormolen & Zaslavsky, 2003), students’ beliefs about them (Zaslavsky & Shir, 2005), 
and students’ guided collaborative development of definitions in contexts new to them 
(Larsen & Zandieh, 2008; Zandieh & Rasmussen, 2010).  Studies have suggested that 
students who spontaneously generate examples in response to new definitions later 
perform better on tasks involving the defined concepts (Dahlberg & Housman, 1997), and 
there has been much recent discussion of the way in which example generation tasks 
might help students to modify their example spaces so that these more closely coincide 
with the extensions of the defined concepts (Mason, 2002; Watson & Mason, 2005; 
Zazkis, Liljedahl & Chernoff, 2008; Zazkis & Leikin, 2008).  Definitions are also 
discussed in the extensive literature on proof, which focuses on the role of definitions as a 
deductive base in arguments about whole classes of objects.  This (desirable) use of 
definitions is often contrasted with students’ attempts to support general arguments by 
using examples in more or less sophisticated ways (Authors, 2004; Harel & Sowder, 
2007; Healy & Hoyles, 2000).  Inappropriate example-based or concept image-based 
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reasoning has been shown to persist even when the students know the appropriate 
definitions (Vinner, 1991) and even when one would think there was little in their 
previous mathematical experience that would support non-deductive strategies (Edwards 
& Ward, 2004).   
The most basic form of definition use, however, is in classifying objects.  Ross 
and Makin (1999) point out that while ‘classification is rarely your ultimate goal when 
you are faced with an unfamiliar object …[it] is a first step in allowing you to know how 
to deal with the entity’ (p.228).  Such knowledge is possible because, in both natural and 
classical situations, classification and definitions have a two-way relationship.   
In the natural world, you may decide that something is a cat because of a level of 
furriness, four-legged-ness etc., but equally if you are told something is a cat, you can 
make a reasonable guess about its having fur and possessing four legs (as well as much 
other information about what it would like to eat, whether it is safe to stroke, how high it 
can jump etc.).  This, of course, involves some measure of personal judgment and 
uncertainty, as captured in the psychological models of natural category learning.   
In the classical world, however, inference is simpler because it does not involve 
personal judgement or uncertainty; you can always decide that a number is composite by 
finding two proper factors and can always conclude from being told that a number is 
composite that it must have (at least) two such factors.  In this sense, mathematical 
classification and argumentation are simpler in logical structure than their everyday 
equivalents, a fact that mathematicians recognise and sometimes attempt to point out to 
their students (Author, 2010).   
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Of course, this does not mean that mathematical classification and reasoning are 
psychologically simpler, partly because the classical model demands consistency in a way 
that everyday classification does not.  As noted earlier, people treat everyday categories 
as though they have internal structure (with ‘better’ and ‘worse’ examples), sometimes to 
the extent that the cueing context may evoke conflicting judgements about category 
membership: in some contexts the Pope may be classified as a bachelor, in he may be 
classified as not-a-bachelor (Rips, 1989; Machery, 2009).  Classification in natural 
category learning can thus lead to situations which would be impossible in classical 
theory and unacceptable in mathematics.   
We argue that in mathematics, even before we consider whether a student is using 
a definition to make a classification judgement, we should consider whether they possess 
this more fundamental idea of ‘concept consistency’: that is, whether they understand that 
there should be a single mechanism for judging whether a mathematical object is a 
member of a set (whether or not that mechanism is a formal definition).  We claim that 
students’ knowledge of this underlying principle is not usually addressed in mathematics 
education research.  Studies have typically made a distinction between classifications or 
arguments based on accepted definitions and classifications or arguments based on 
concept images or examples.  That approach addresses the issue of whether students 
know the accepted definitions and classify according to these, but not whether they 
behave as though there ought to be consistent classification even in cases in which they 
have not yet learned the standard definition.  
Zandieh and Rasmussen (2010) and Zaslavsky and Shir (2005) have shown that 
college students and high-achieving upper high school students can engage in discussions 
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about desirable properties of definitions and do seem to understand that the goal is to 
decide on a definition that covers all possible cases.  However, in both cases this work 
was conducted in a collaborative learning situation, so it does not speak to the behaviour 
of individuals when asked to classify objects without discussion, nor to the issue of 
whether classification is consistent in the absence of a definition.   
We suggest that the principle of concept consistency would be more clearly 
manifest if students were asked individually to classify objects as they saw fit, prior to an 
encounter with the accepted definition.  In this paper, we take such an approach and 
present evidence that at least some beginning university students behave as though they 
do not possess concept consistency – that is, they do not appear to use a single 
mechanism for making classification judgements.  Specifically, we ask: 
1. How does classification differ before and after exposure to a relevant definition? 
2. To what extent are students’ responses consistent either with a reasonable 
interpretation of these definitions or, more fundamentally, consistent with each 
other? 
Methods 
Participants and Context 
Our study involved 187 students in the first year of study for a mathematics or 
mathematics-related degree at a highly ranked UK university.  The students were all high 
achieving, having attained the highest grade in their pre-university mathematics 
examinations in order to enter their degree course.  The study took place in week four of 
a real analysis course as part of a standard lecture period where the lecturer allotted time 
for the researchers to conduct the task.  The intention was to expose students to a concept 
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which they had not yet formally encountered, but for which they could be expected to 
have spontaneous conceptions associated with everyday language and earlier 
mathematical experience.  In addition, we wanted a concept for which some examples 
could be considered ‘central’ to the categories while others could be considered to be 
‘boundary’ cases, so that natural classification might reasonably lead to a range of 
different responses.  We thus used the key concepts of ‘increasing’ and ‘decreasing’ as 
applied to sequences; while the students already had four weeks experience of formal 
mathematics (including work with sequences and the formal definition of convergence), 
definitions for ‘increasing’ and ‘decreasing’ in the context of sequences had not been 
introduced. These definitions also had the advantage that they are logically very simple, 
each having only one (universal) quantifier and one condition.  
Task 
The task had three phases: a pre-definition classification phase; a definition 
presentation and a post-definition classification phase.  In both the pre-definition and 
post-definition classification phases, the participants were given a sheet with each of the 
sequences shown in Figure 1 listed on it.  Beside each sequence were four boxes marked 
‘I’, ‘D’, ‘B’ and ‘N’, and the participants were asked to tick exactly one of these to 
indicate whether they would classify the sequence as ‘increasing’, ‘decreasing’, ‘both 
increasing and decreasing’ or ‘neither increasing nor decreasing’.  During each 
classification phase, students were able to work through the questions in any order and 
were able to alter choices as they wished.  However, at the end of the pre-definition 
phase, participants were asked to turn to the post-definition page and not turn back.  
There was no evidence that this request was ignored. 
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 INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Between the classification phases, the participants were given a short presentation 
in which one of the researchers displayed the formal definitions of ‘increasing’ and 
‘decreasing’ for real sequences using symbolism consistent with that used by the lecturer 
(Figure 2), checked that students were familiar with all of the symbols, and read the 
definitions aloud.  No examples were given, nor was any other support for the 
classification task (such as natural language meanings) given.  The definitions remained 
visible on the main lecture theatre screen while the students completed the post-definition 
classification, in which they were explicitly asked to classify according to these 
definitions. 
 INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
In the pre-definition phase, students were also given the option to select ‘not 
sure’, but only a minority of students chose this for any sequence.  To allow comparisons 
across phases, this data was discarded along with any spoiled or incomplete scripts, 
leaving 146 complete paired sets of data.  Data was collated to give both cross-participant 
response rates and individualised patterns of responses as analysed below. 
 
Results 
The Effect of Presenting the Definitions 
Table 1 shows the number of participants who classified each sequence in each 
category in the pre-definition phase.  It is clear that, for some sequences, almost every 
student classified in a way that is in keeping with the definition: 
B:1,4,9,16,25,36,49,64,…, C:	  	  
€ 
1, 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 16 , 17 , 18 ,…, I:!!
! 
"#"$ %"# &' %"#() %"#"*"+ %"#&"&$ %… and J:
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€ 
−2,−4,−6,−8,−10,… are all central category members in the sense that everyday uses of 
‘increasing’ and ‘decreasing’ coincide naturally with the formal definition.  This is 
somewhat less true for G: 6,6,7,7,8,8,9,9,…, although most still classified it as increasing.  
Sequence D:	  	  
€ 
1,−1,2,−2,3,−3,4,−4,… provoked substantial agreement amongst the 
students, who tended to classify it as ‘both increasing and decreasing’, a response that 
differs from the definition-based classification.  For sequences F: 1,3,2,4,3,5,4,6,… and 
H: 0,1,0,2,0,3,0,4,… there was a split between the classifications ‘both’ and ‘increasing’, 
with only a minority selecting the normatively correct classification ‘neither’. 
 INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
It is important to consider the responses to sequence E: 3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,….  There 
are two sensible formal mathematical definitions of the concept of ‘increasing’, 
depending on whether each term is required to be strictly greater than its predecessor or 
whether the weaker ‘greater than or equal to’ relationship is used.  Item E would be 
classified as ‘neither’ with the strict interpretation and as ‘both’ with the non-strict 
alternative.  In the pre-definition classification task, every student classified it as 
‘neither’.  This was counted as correct for analysis of the pre-definition responses only, 
because the definitions presented were formal definitions of ‘increasing’ and ‘decreasing’ 
in the non-strict sense.   
In the pre-definition phase, students would have been highly unlikely to make 
classification judgements based on a formal definition, since this had not been presented 
to them.  They clearly made some judgements which matched the extension of the formal 
definition and some which did not.  This data thus fits Davis and Vinner’s (1986) notion 
of concept image-based classification: for sequences that display simple, familiar 
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behaviours, most responses matched the extension of the definitions, and for those that do 
not, responses were considerably more mixed.   
In the post-definition phase, students had access to the formal definitions and we 
might therefore expect their responses to be in line with these.  However, they also still 
had access to whatever decision mechanisms they had previously used, and we can see 
the impact of this in their post-definition responses, as shown in Table 2.  Again, 
sequences B, C, I and J were classified almost perfectly consistently with the definitions.  
For all other sequences it was possible to see clear changes in the patterns of responses 
from the pre-definition to the post-definition phase.  We conducted Fisher Exact Tests for 
each item to examine these changes, and found that for items B, C, I and J there was no 
significant difference between the response patterns (p > 0.999 in each case), but for 
every other item the difference was significant (p < 0.001 in each case).   
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Note that the average number of correct classifications (that is, those which matched the 
extension of the formal definition given) increased from 6.65 (σ = 1.19) to 7.82 
(σ = 2.04), which is a significant (t = 6.1077, p < 0.001) and moderate-to-large difference 
(d = 0.70).  The data thus show an improvement in classification relative to the 
definitions after these were presented.  However, it is surprising that the effect is not 
larger.  Given the experience of the students with definitions and the relatively simple 
concept involved in the task, one could have expected a near perfect post-definition 
classification.  In fact, in the next section, we shall see that only 29% of the participants’ 
classifications were fully in line with the given definitions. 
 
 Running head: Classification and Concept Consistency 
 14 
Pre-Definition Classification Consistency 
Our principal concern in this paper is not the particular classifications made, but 
the inferences we can make about the extent to which students appeared to use a single 
mechanism for judging whether the sequences were increasing/decreasing; that is, the 
extent to which they exhibited concept consistency.  For this purpose, it is clear that some 
items did not discriminate between students, notably those sequences that were classified 
almost perfectly in line with the definitions in the pre-definition phase.  As a result, our 
subsequent analysis omits those sequences and also omits the small number of 
participants who classified any of these apparently straightforward items incorrectly at 
either stage (leaving N = 136).  For the remaining items A, D, E, F, G and H we produced 
a response profile for each participant.  The normatively correct profile is shown in 
Figure 3. 
 INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
It was not expected that the pre-definition responses would be identical across the 
group.  However, if students possess concept consistency we would expect to see only a 
small number of response profiles, each linked to a possible classification mechanism.  
Instead, across 136 students, we saw 24 different response profiles, none of which was 
the profile consistent with either mathematically acceptable definition (NNBNIN or 
NNNNIN).  Table 3 shows the six most commonly occurring profiles (all 24 are given in 
Appendix A). 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
To consider the issue of concept consistency in detail, we developed a method of 
‘plausible explanations’: for each profile, we tried to identify fixed sets of properties or 
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key features (in the sense of Ross and Makin, 1999) which could account for all the 
responses.  The method of ‘plausible explanations’ can be seen as a form of abductive 
reasoning; constructing hypotheses which would account for the responses if the student 
possessed concept consistency (Magnani, 2001).  In cases where no plausible explanation 
could be constructed for the given response, we argue that this constitutes abductive 
evidence that the student did not possess concept consistency.  
One could argue that some students might possess concept consistency – they 
may be trying to use a single mechanism for making their classification judgements – but 
make mistakes in applying the mechanism they have in mind.  While we accept this 
possibility, we think it would be unlikely to have a large impact here because the task 
was a straightforward one involving familiar concepts, the students were all high 
achieving, and the given definitions are logically simpler than most they had already 
encountered on their course.   
Indeed, we would argue that the plausible explanation method may overestimate 
consistency: the existence of a plausible explanation does not guarantee that any given 
student used a single mechanism for making their classification judgements.  Some 
students may have used different mechanisms for different items (i.e. lacked concept 
consistency) but nonetheless given a response profile for which it happens that there is a 
plausible explanation.  In any case, we argue that the method does provide some 
indication of the number of students who did or did not use a consistent classification 
scheme.   
The response profiles for which we could generate a plausible explanation are: 
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BBNBIB: This profile appears to be consistent with a ‘local’ interpretation.  That 
is, if some terms are less than their immediate predecessors and others are 
greater then the sequence is classified as ‘both’, and if all the terms are 
equal then it is classified as ‘neither’. 
NBNIII: There were two plausible explanations for this profile. In one, the 
participant might treat the sequence as two separate sequences and classify 
them separately (so, for instance, F:1,3,2,4,3,5,4,6,… is increasing because 
it is composed of two interleaved increasing sequences).  Alternatively, the 
participant may associate the informal notion of ‘increasing’ with what 
would formally be called ‘unbounded above’. 
NNNIII: This profile appears to be consistent with a ‘holistic’ interpretation, 
seeking trends across the sequence as a whole rather than being influenced 
by local behaviour.  For instance, F:1,3,2,4,3,5,4,6,… could be seen as 
increasing ‘overall’ with small steps backward not treated as an important 
feature.  One could view this as an implicit consideration of the ‘limiting 
bounds’: the sequence of infima and suprema of the sequence of tail 
sequences. 
BBNBNB: This profile is very similar to the modal profile and fits the ‘local’ 
interpretation, except that G: 6,6,7,7,8,8,9,9,… is classified as ‘neither’, 
perhaps because of an interpretation in which between some consecutive 
pairs there is an increase and between others there is not. 
We note that these classification mechanisms are entirely sensible; in the absence of any 
specified criteria, each represents a reasonable interpretation of the meanings of 
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increasing and decreasing in this context, and the way these terms combine. In particular, 
our plausible explanations suggest that students’ concept images might cause them to 
focus locally (on pairs or small finite sets of consecutive terms) or holistically (the 
limiting bounds of a sequence or its long-term behaviour) rather than universally (across 
all pairs of consecutive terms).  Indeed, lecturers teaching this subject might find it useful 
to know that large numbers of students seem to naturally interpret ‘increasing and 
decreasing’ in these local or holistic senses, and that this potential for conflict will need 
to be addressed if their interpretation is to be brought into line with the definitions.   
Here, however, we are interested in the fact that these four categories account for 
only 72% of the responses.  For the other 28% (18 distinct response profiles), we were 
unable to generate a plausible explanation, and we argue that this indicates that these 
students may lack an underlying idea of concept consistency.  To illustrate this 
phenomenon, we consider two such profiles.   
First, consider BBNIII.  One can develop plausible explanations that account for 
parts of this profile: for example, A: 0,1,0,1,0,1,0,1,… and D: 	  	  
€ 
1,−1,2,−2,3,−3,4,−4,… 
might be classified as ‘both’ because they increase and decrease ‘locally’.  F: 
1,3,2,4,3,5,4,6,… and G: 6,6,7,7,8,8,9,9,… might be classified as ‘increasing’ because 
they are increasing ‘holistically’.  However, neither explanation accounts for the whole 
response profile and we thus conclude that these students are unlikely to have judged 
consistently using a single judgement mechanism.   
Similarly, in profile NBNBIB, sequences D: 	  	  
€ 
1,−1,2,−2,3,−3,4,−4,…, F: 
1,3,2,4,3,5,4,6,… and H: 0,1,0,2,0,3,0,4,… can be classified as ‘both’ with the ‘local’ 
interpretation, but this cannot account for the ‘neither’ classification given for A: 
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0,1,0,1,0,1,0,1,….  For both profiles, it appears that the students evoked different parts of 
their concept image or focused on different key features when responding to the different 
sequences; their classifications did not manifest concept consistency. 
Overall, then, this ‘plausible explanation’ method suggests that around a quarter 
of the participants appeared not to classify consistently.  
 
Post-Definition Classification Consistency 
After exposure to the definition, participants had a new basis on which to classify.  
They were specifically instructed to classify according to the given definitions, which 
remained on display throughout the time the students worked on the task.  One might 
therefore expect fewer distinct response profiles, but in fact there were more: 28 in total, 
all of which appear in Appendix B.  Table 4 lists the six most commonly occurring 
response profiles for the post-definition classification task.  
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
When looking at the pre-definition task, we were concerned with the extent to 
which students responded consistently according to some set of (internally held) criteria.  
The presence of given definitions in this task, however, changes our focus.  For this task, 
if a student possessed concept consistency, we would expect either a response profile 
given by one of the plausible explanations above or, if the student understood that they 
needed to classify with the definition, a normatively correct response profile. 
The profiles in Table 4 show that 40 students gave the normatively correct profile 
NNBNIN, and a further 10 gave one which is consistent with a plausible misreading of 
the definitions – reading the inequalities as strict – giving the NNNNNN profile.  In 
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addition, nine people gave responses that were consistent with one of the profiles 
generated by the plausible explanations method outlined above (BBNBNB or NBNIII).  
The remaining 77 students (57%) gave responses which were neither consistent with the 
definitions, nor with the ‘strict’ misreading, nor with a plausible set of internal criteria.  
In all it appears that the availability of the definitions did not immediately result in 
normatively correct classifications and actually led to a drop in apparent concept 
consistency across the sample.   
 
Discussion 
Our study explored the concepts of ‘increasing’ and ‘decreasing’ in the context of 
real sequences, with the aim of examining how students’ classifications differ in the 
absence and presence of a definition and, in particular, whether these classifications were 
consistent with a single judgement mechanism. 
In the development of the abductive ‘plausible explanations’ method, we believe 
we may also have shed some light on students’ concept images of ‘increasing’ and 
‘decreasing’ when they are used in a new context.  In particular, the results suggest that 
students may focus on local behaviour (on pairs or small finite sets of consecutive terms) 
or on holistic behaviour (the limiting bounds of a sequence or its long-term behaviour) 
rather than on the universal behaviour captured by the formal definition. 
Our main aim, however, was to investigate the issue of concept consistency.  Tall 
and Vinner’s concept image/concept definition distinction, along with the considerable 
body of research based on it, has illuminated one vital aspect of what students need to 
learn in order to make sense of advanced mathematics.  However, we have argued that 
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investigation of this issue has usually focused on whether or not students operate 
according to the accepted definitions and, in so doing, has overlooked the issue of 
whether or not they possess the more fundamental principle of concept consistency.  In 
this paper we have explored this issue by considering students’ responses to pre- and 
post-definition classification tasks.   
We found, first, that exposure to the formal definition did improve classification 
performance, in the sense that more students classified more sequences in accordance 
with the definitions.  However, this improvement was not as drastic as might be expected 
given that the context was familiar and the definitions were simple: in the post-definition 
classification task, only 29% classified in a way which fully matched the extension of the 
given definitions.  
More notably, in both the pre- and post-definition tasks, a large number of 
students did not appear to use a single mechanism for classification at all – that is, their 
responses lacked concept consistency.  While it has previously been observed that 
students evoke different, sometimes contradictory concept images in response to different 
cues or problems (Dahlberg & Housman, 1997), we found the extent to which this 
occurred in this case somewhat surprising: within each phase the classifications were 
completed on the same page, in the space of a few minutes, with all the participant’s 
responses visible at once and with no restriction on going back to change a previous 
answer.   
The fact that the degree of consistency actually dropped from the pre- to the post-
definition task suggests that it may be difficult even for a student who is trying to classify 
consistently to maintain this criterion while also incorporating new information.  Such 
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difficulties might occur in three ways: first, such a student might read the definitions 
insufficiently carefully and thus misapply them throughout or in particular cases; second, 
they might understand the definitions correctly but be swayed by earlier interpretations in 
some or all cases; third, they might not even consider changing an answer that they think 
is obvious (which seems particularly likely in the case of the constant sequence). 
Whatever the relative frequencies of these occurrences, the result raises questions for 
those designing instruction at this level.  It might seem intuitively obvious that students 
should be exposed to a variety of examples in order to improve the correspondence 
between their individual example spaces and the conventional spaces, but our results 
suggest that even in simple cases, instructors should be prepared for a period of confusion 
and errors resulting from conflict between concept image- and concept definition-based 
judgments.  
Clearly, of course, this study has looked at only one concept in one topic area 
during the transition to advanced mathematical thinking.  It may be that some of the 
issues would be different if the students had more (or less) prior experience of related 
concepts, or if the concepts were described using terms that did not have familiar 
everyday meanings.  However, the issue of concept consistency seems important as a 
precursor for learning to work effectively with definitions in advanced mathematics: if a 
student is not aware that classification should be done on a consistent basis, they are less 
likely to attend to the agreed definitions.  It may therefore be that some students would 
benefit from instruction that focused on this principle. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
Full list of pre-definition response profiles: 
Response profile Frequency 
B B N B I B 43 
N B N I I I 28 
N N N I I I 7 
B B N B N B 6 
B B N I I I 6 
N B N B I B 6 
N N N N I N 5 
B B N B I I 4 
N B N I I B 4 
N B N I I N 4 
N N N I I N 4 
B B N I I B 3 
N D N I I I 2 
N N N N N N 2 
B B N B D B 1 
B B N I I N 1 
B D N I I B 1 
B D N N N B 1 
B N N I I I 1 
N B N B I I 1 
N B N N I I 1 
N N N B I N 1 
N N N I N N 1 
N N N N I I 1 
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Appendix B 
Full list of post-definition response profiles: 
Response profile Frequency 
N N B N I N 40 
N N N N I N 22 
B B N B I B 13 
B B B B I B 11 
N N N N N N 10 
B B N B N B 8 
B B B B B B 3 
N B N B N B 3 
B N B N I N 2 
N B N B I N 2 
N B N N I N 2 
N B N N N N 2 
N N B I I N 2 
N N I N I N 2 
B B B I I B 1 
B B I B I B 1 
B B N B N N 1 
B B N I I B 1 
B N B N I B 1 
B N N B I B 1 
N B I N I N 1 
N B N B I B 1 
N B N I I I 1 
N N B N B N 1 
N N B N N N 1 
N N I B I N 1 
N N I I I N 1 
N N N I N I 1 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Pre-definition responses (asterisks indicate normative definition-based 
classifications). 
 
 I D B N 
A: 0,1,0,1,0,1,0,1,… 0 0 74 72* 
B: 1,4,9,16,25,36,49,64,… 146* 0 0 0 
C: 	  	  
€ 
1, 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 16 , 17 , 18 ,… 0 145* 1 0 
D: 	  	  
€ 
1,−1,2,−2,3,−3,4,−4,… 0 4 119 23* 
E: 3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,… 0 0 0* 146* 
F: 1,3,2,4,3,5,4,6,… 65 0 69 12* 
G: 6,6,7,7,8,8,9,9,… 133* 1 0 12 
H: 0,1,0,2,0,3,0,4,… 55 0 72 19* 
I: 	  	  
€ 
1012 ,10 34 ,1078 ,101516 ,103132 ,… 140* 4 2 0 
J: 	  	  
€ 
−2,−4,−6,−8,−10,… 1 145* 0 0 
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Table 2: Post-definition responses (asterisks indicate normative definition-based 
classifications). 
 
 I D B N 
A: 0,1,0,1,0,1,0,1,… 0 1 44 101* 
B: 1,4,9,16,25,36,49,64,… 146* 0 0 0 
C: 	  	  
€ 
1, 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 16 , 17 , 18 ,… 1 145* 0 0 
D: 	  	  
€ 
1,−1,2,−2,3,−3,4,−4,… 0 1 53 92* 
E: 3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,… 6 0 69* 71 
F: 1,3,2,4,3,5,4,6,… 7 0 48 91* 
G: 6,6,7,7,8,8,9,9,… 113* 0 5 28 
H: 0,1,0,2,0,3,0,4,… 2 0 47 97* 
I: 	  	  
€ 
1012 ,10 34 ,1078 ,101516 ,103132 ,… 141* 3 2 0 
J: 	  	  
€ 
−2,−4,−6,−8,−10,… 0 145* 0 1 
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Table 3: The six most common pre-definition response profiles for items A,D,E,F,G,H. 
 
Response profile Frequency 
B B N B I B 43 
N B N I I I 28 
N N N I I I 7 
B B N B N B 6 
B B N I I I 6 
N B N B I B 6 
 
 
Table 4: The six most frequent post-definition responses for items A,D,E,F,G,H. 
 
Post-definition response profile Frequency 
N N B N I N 40 
N N N N I N 22 
B B N B I B 13 
B B B B I B 11 
N N N N N N 10 
B B N B N B 8 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. The sequence items for the pre-definition and post-definition task. 
A: 0,1,0,1,0,1,0,1,…  
B: 1,4,9,16,25,36,49,64,… 
C: 	  	  
€ 
1, 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 16 , 17 , 18 ,… 
D: 	  	  
€ 
1,−1,2,−2,3,−3,4,−4,… 
E: 3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,…  
F: 1,3,2,4,3,5,4,6,…  
G: 6,6,7,7,8,8,9,9,…    
H: 0,1,0,2,0,3,0,4,…  
I: 	  	  
€ 
1012 ,10 34 ,1078 ,101516 ,103132 ,… 
J: 	  	  
€ 
−2,−4,−6,−8,−10,… 
 
Figure 2. The formal definitions given in the presentation phase. 
A sequence 	  	  
€ 
xn{ }n=1∞  is increasing if and only if 	  	  
€ 
∀n∈N, 	  	  
€ 
xn+1 ≥ xn. 
A sequence 	  	  
€ 
xn{ }n=1∞  is decreasing if and only if 	  	  
€ 
∀n∈N, 	  	  
€ 
xn+1 ≤ xn . 
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Figure 3. The normatively correct responses for the reduced list of sequences, giving 
response profile NNBNIN (note that this would read NNNNIN if the strict interpretation 
were taken). 
A: 0,1,0,1,0,1,0,1,…  N 
D: 	  	  
€ 
1,−1,2,−2,3,−3,4,−4,… N 
E: 3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,…  B 
F: 1,3,2,4,3,5,4,6,…  N 
G: 6,6,7,7,8,8,9,9,…    I 
H: 0,1,0,2,0,3,0,4,…  N 
 
